Strength of visual percept generated by famous faces perceived without awareness: effects of affective valence, response latency, and visual field by Stone, A. et al.
 
 
University of East London Institutional Repository: http://roar.uel.ac.uk  
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please 
scroll down to view the document itself. Please refer to the repository record for this 
item and our policy information available from the repository home page for further 
information. 
 
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
Author(s): Stone, Anna; Valentine, Tim. 
Title: Strength of visual percept generated by famous faces perceived without 
awareness: Effects of affective valence, response latency, and visual field. 
Year of publication: 2005 
Citation: Stone, A., Valentine, T. (2005) ‘Strength of visual percept generated by 
famous faces perceived without awareness: Effects of affective valence, response 
latency, and visual field.', Consciousness and Cognition, 14 (3), pp.548-564. 
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2005.01.009    
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2005.01.009 
  
 
Strength of visual percept generated by famous faces  
perceived without awareness:  
Effects of affective valence, response latency, and visual field. 
 
Anna Stone*, Tim Valentine 
Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths College, University of London, UK 
* Please address correspondence to: A.Stone@uel.ac.uk 
 
The preparation of this paper was supported by an award from the Economic and Social 
Research Council, UK, reference PTA-026-27-0332.  
 
Abstract 
Participants who were unable to detect familiarity from masked 17 ms faces 
(Stone & Valentine, 2004, in press-b) did report a vague, partial visual percept. Two 
experiments investigated the relative strength of the visual percept generated by 
famous and unfamiliar faces, using masked 17 ms exposure. Each trial presented 
simultaneously a famous and an unfamiliar face, one face in LVF and the other in RVF. 
In one task, participants responded according to which of the faces generated the 
stronger visual percept, and in the other task, they attempted an explicit familiarity 
decision. The relative strength of the visual percept of the famous face compared to the 
unfamiliar face was moderated by response latency and participants attitude towards 
the famous person. There was also an interaction of visual field with response latency, 
suggesting that the right hemisphere can generate a visual percept differentiating 
famous from unfamiliar faces more rapidly than the left hemisphere. Participants were at 
chance in the explicit familiarity decision, confirming the absence of awareness of facial 
familiarity.  
Keywords: Non-conscious perception; Facial identity; Awareness; Visual masking; 
Affect; Attitude; Response latency; Hemisphere; Disgust  
Introduction 
There is much evidence that facial expressions can be detected pre-consciously 
and can influence psychophysiological and behavioural responses without awareness of 
the particular expression (e.g., Dimberg & Ohman, 1996; Dimberg, Thunberg, & 
Elmehed, 2000; Johnsen & Hugdahl, 1991, 1993; Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Murphy & 
Zajonc, 1993; Niedenthal, 1990; Ohman, Esteves, & Soares, 1995; Robinson, 1998; 
Saban & Hugdahl, 1999; Whalen et al., 1998; Wong, Shevrin, & Williams, 1994). All of 
these studies presented masked faces for very brief exposure duration (target-to-mask 
stimulus onset asynchrony [SOA] of less than 35 ms). Participants were at chance in 
two-alternative forced-choice tasks of identifying the expression, confirming the absence 
of awareness.  
The generation of an appropriate response to a facial expression that is 
recognised without awareness of the expression is often interpreted in terms of the 
importance to the individual of detecting and reacting to the emotion of others. Many 
stimuli in the environment are scanned pre-consciously, and those with the greatest 
salience, e.g., emotional faces as opposed to neutral faces, are prioritised for 
processing. This raises the question of whether a famous face would be prioritised for 
processing in competition with an unfamiliar face when both are perceived without 
awareness of familiarity. Given evidence that famous faces can be recognised as 
specific individuals without awareness of facial identity (Banse, 1999, 2001; Stone, 
Valentine, & Davis, 2001)or familiarity (Stone & Valentine, 2004, in press-a, in press-b), 
it seems plausible that a known face would be judged more salient than an unknown 
face. One effect of prioritising a face for processing might be that the face would 
generate a stronger visual percept, even though the visual percept was vague, partial, 
and insufficient to permit awareness of facial identity or familiarity. The relative strength 
of the consciously experienced visual percept generated by famous and unfamiliar 
faces was investigated in the present experiments.  
Participants performed three tasks in which masked 17ms faces were presented 
in simultaneous pairs of one famous and one unfamiliar face, one face in the left visual 
field (LVF) and the other in the right visual field. Each pair of faces was matched on 
age, sex, race, pose, and facial expression. In the perceptual comparison, participants 
selected the face that generated the stronger consciously experienced visual percept. 
The rationale was the observation from previous experiments that most participants are 
able to gain some vague, partial visual impression of the stimulus faces, or at least the 
impression of ‘‘something there.’’ In the explicit familiarity decision, participants 
attempted to select the famous face in each pair: this was the task reported in Stone 
and Valentine (2004, in press-b). Overall performance at chance would indicate the 
absence of awareness of facial familiarity, and by assumption, the absence of 
awareness of facial identity. In the attention orientation task, the faces were followed by 
a dot-probe consisting of two small dots, either horizontal (..) or vertical (:), presented in 
either the LVF or the RVF, in a location corresponding to the centre of one of the 
famous–unfamiliar faces. Participants performed a speeded two-alternative forced-
choice discrimination on the type of dot-probe. Orientation of attention to the famous 
face in a pair would be shown by faster or more accurate responses to the dot-probe in 
the same visual field as the famous face than in the opposite visual field. This task is 
reported in Stone and Valentine (in press-a).  
Each participant defined each famous person as either good or evil (Experiment 
1) or low-or high-disgust evoking (Experiment 2) in a rating procedure subsequent to the 
experimental tasks. It was expected that the perceptual comparison would be 
moderated by the participants’ affective response to the famous face. Several 
conceptual accounts have been proposed to explain how feedback connections from 
high-level attributes of a stimulus can modify the strength of earlier perceptual 
representations of the stimulus (e.g., Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; Kanwisher, 2001; 
Martens, Wolters, & van Raamsdonk, 2002; Vogel, Luck, & Shapiro, 1998). These 
accounts propose that a stimulus proceeds through stages of processing from early 
perceptual analysis to identification and extraction of identity-dependent properties, e.g., 
affective valence. This can occur before awareness of the stimulus identity is achieved. 
Feedback connections from representations of high-level properties to earlier perceptual 
representations can modify the strength of these earlier representations. These 
conceptual accounts explain how an identity-dependent attribute of a stimulus, e.g., 
affective valence, can modify the strength of the consciously experienced visual 
percept.  
There are grounds for expecting that the relationship between the affect invoked 
by a stimulus and the strength of the visual percept would vary with response latency, 
reasoned as follows. Modification of the strength of the consciously experienced visual 
percept would require some time to become apparent, being dependent on feedback 
projections. Also, there is evidence from the affective priming literature that automatic 
effects of stimulus valence are transient (De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998; Glaser 
& Banaji, 1999; Hermans, de Houwer, & Eelen, 1994, 2001; Klauer, Rossnagel, & 
Musch, 1997; see Fazio, 2001, for a review). Applying these concepts to the present 
experiments, the activation of affective valence associated with a famous face was 
expected to modulate the strength of the visual percept within a range of response 
latencies, not including very fast or slower latencies.  
What effect would this modulation have? In the explicit familiarity decision (Stone 
& Valentine, 2004, in press-b) responses were below chance accuracy to evil-disliked 
faces and tended to be above chance accuracy for good-liked faces. Participants 
selected the paired unfamiliar face rather than the famous face if they evaluated the 
famous person as evil or disliked, and tended to select the famous face if they 
evaluated the person as good or liked. The attention orientation task suggested that 
attention was oriented towards a famous face if the person was evaluated as good or 
neutral, but oriented towards the paired unfamiliar face if the famous person was 
evaluated as evil (Stone & Valentine, in press-a).  
Stone et al. (2001) had previously reported that physiological responses to 
famous faces perceived without awareness of identity differed according to valence. 
Experiment 1found that skin conductance responses to masked 17ms faces were 
higher to the faces of famous persons subsequently evaluated ‘‘good’’ than to the faces 
of persons evaluated ‘‘evil,’’ but did not distinguish between famous and unfamiliar 
faces. (Responses tended to be higher to good faces than to unfamiliar faces, but 
tended to be lower to evil faces than to unfamiliar faces.) When faces were exposed for 
220ms, a duration that permits conscious recognition, there was an effect of familiarity 
but no effect of valence: skin conductance responses were higher to famous faces than 
to unfamiliar faces with no difference between ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘evil’’ faces.  
These results all seem to suggest that participants who regard a famous person 
as evil tend to process the masked 17ms face somehow less strongly than those who 
regard the person as good. In the present study, it seems likely that the indistinct visual 
percept of the face would be weakened for participants who evaluate the person as evil, 
and strengthened for participants who evaluate the person as good, relative to an 
unfamiliar face. The perceptual comparison task asked participants to select which of 
the famous and unfamiliar faces in each pair yielded the stronger visual percept. 
‘‘Accuracy’’ was defined as the selection of the famous face in each pair. From the 
above reasoning the expectation was derived that responses to evil faces would be less 
accurate than responses to good faces, for some range of response latencies, not 
including very fast or slower latencies.  
The present experiments were also designed to investigate another factor: the 
right hemisphere superiority in processing facial identity (e.g., Grabowska & Nowicka, 
1996; Heider & Groner, 1997; Schweinberger, Sommer, & Stiller, 1994; Sergent, 
MacDonald, & Zuck, 1994), which suggests that the right hemisphere would be 
expected to generate a stronger visual percept of a famous face than the left 
hemisphere. However, things are not this simple. Seeck et al. (1997) reported that early 
ERPs differed between famous and unfamiliar faces only in the right hemisphere, 
whereas later ERPs differed between famous and unfamiliar faces in both hemispheres. 
This suggests that the LH may be able to construct a visual percept that distinguishes 
between a famous and an unfamiliar face, but more slowly than the RH. It follows that a 
famous face presented in the left visual field and projected to the right hemisphere 
(LVF-RH) would generate a stronger visual percept than the paired unfamiliar face 
(presented in the RVF-LH), on short and long latency trials. In contrast, a famous face 
presented in the RVF-LH would generate a stronger visual percept than the paired 
unfamiliar face (in the LVF-RH) only on longer latency trials and not on short latency 
trials. This leads to the prediction that accuracy (selecting the famous face in each pair 
as having the stronger visual percept) will be higher for famous faces presented in the 
LVF than the RVF on short latency responses, with no difference in accuracy between 
LVF and RVF on longer latency responses. Accuracy for famous faces in the RVF 
should increase from short to long latency responses, while accuracy for famous faces 
in the LVF should not change with response latency.  
The original design intention was to perform analysis within participants, 
calculating mean accuracy for each participant for the faces rated as good vs. mean 
accuracy for the faces rated as evil. Experiment 1posed the problem that the famous 
persons tended to be rated consistently as either good or evil, so that any differential 
responding to good and evil faces according to participants’ evaluations could be 
confounded with another factor that differed systematically between the stimuli, e.g., a 
physical attribute of the faces or the particular photographic image. To overcome this 
difficulty, the analysis was performed within items, calculating mean accuracy for each 
item over the participants rating the famous person as good vs. those rating the same 
famous person as evil. Thus, good and evil stimuli were identical, and the only 
difference was the participants’ attitude towards the famous persons. Uneven numbers 
of participants contributed to the calculations in the good and evil categories for famous 
persons whose rating tended to be consistent.  
The analysis of Experiment 1was limited by the small number of items (n = 10) 
and so should be regarded as illustrative and requiring replication. Experiment 2 
provides the replication. For convenience, throughout the remainder of this paper, an 
accurate response will refer to the selection of the famous face in each pair.  
Experiment 1 
Method  
Participants  
Participants were 34students, staff and visitors at Goldsmiths College, London. 
Each participants individual performance was at chance in the explicit familiarity task 
(binomial distribution, one-tailed, cut-off at 65%, α = 0.05). Data were excluded from 
seven participants who failed to identify a minimum of eight faces in total, including two 
evaluated as good and two evaluated as evil, in the post-experimental evaluation. The 
remaining 27 participants were 18 female and 9 male, aged between 20 and 51, mean = 
27.2, s.d. = 7.5 years.  
 
Stimuli  
Photographs of famous and unknown faces of a uniform quality were digitised to 
produce images of 16 greys, 150 x 200 pixels in size. The stimulus set comprised 10 
pairs of one famous with one unfamiliar face. The faces in each pair were matched on 
sex, race, and approximate age, and showed a similar pose and facial expression. 
Names and examples of stimuli are given in Appendices A and B. The mask was a 
collage of parts of unfamiliar faces, of the same size as the famous and unfamiliar 
faces.  
Stone et al. (2001) suggested that very few faces could be recognised when 
presented for 17ms with a mask similar to that used in the present series of 
experiments. In that study, faces were presented singly and centrally, and it was 
expected that conscious identification would be even less likely with faces presented 
off-centre in simultaneous pairs.  
Apparatus  
A personal computer running MEL2 software was used to display the faces at a 
640 x 480 screen resolution. Response times and accuracy of response were measured 
and recorded by the computer.  
Design  
Participants performed three separate tasks with masked 17ms faces, always in 
the sequence of attention orientation, explicit familiarity, and perceptual comparison. 
The perceptual comparison task was always performed last in order to maximise the 
likelihood that participants had started to gain some visual percept of the masked faces. 
The attention orientation task was described in Section 1.  
The explicit familiarity and perceptual comparison tasks were similar: the explicit 
familiarity task asked participants to select the famous face in each pair, while the 
perceptual comparison task asked participants to select the face that yielded the 
stronger visual impression. The dependent variable was accuracy of response, and a 
correct response was scored by selecting the famous face. Each face pair was 
presented four times, with the famous face appearing twice each in left and right visual 
fields, for a total of 40 trials, presented in a single block. The sequence of presentation 
was randomised by the computer for each participant. Valence (evil or good) was 
derived from an evaluation given by each participant for each famous person after the 
three tasks of attention orientation, explicit familiarity, and perceptual comparison.  
Procedure  
Participants performed individually in a darkened, air-conditioned room at a 
constant level of background lighting. Stimulus presentation was identical in both tasks. 
The two faces were each approximately 4.5cm by 6cm and were presented at a 
distance of 9cm apart, subtending a visual angle of approximately 4 degrees from 
fixation. The masks were presented in the same screen position as the faces.  
The sequence of events on each trial was as follows: central fixation cross for 
500ms, forward masks for 100ms, famous and unfamiliar face for 17ms, backward 
masks for 100ms, question ‘‘left or right’’ in the centre of the screen displayed until the 
participants responded. The explicit familiarity response was made by pressing one of 
two keys: to the left of the keyboard to indicate the face in the LVF, and to the right of 
the keyboard to indicate the face in the RVF. In the perceptual comparison task there 
was a third response option of ‘‘about equal’’ made by pressing a key in the centre of 
the keyboard. Response time and accuracy were recorded by the computer. Each trial 
was initiated by the response to the previous trial after an inter-trial interval of 1s.  
Participants were informed that two faces would be flashed up very briefly, one 
on either side of the screen, preceded and followed by a mask comprised of a collage of 
parts of unfamiliar faces. Each pair of faces would contain one famous person and one 
unfamiliar person. In the explicit familiarity task, participants were asked to select on 
which side of the screen the famous face had appeared. Participants were told they 
would find it very difficult to see the real faces and this should be no cause for concern, 
but they should attend carefully to the screen, wait for the question, and respond. They 
were informed that it was OK to guess if they were unable to see anything of the faces. 
Participants were asked to look at the central fixation cross before each trial and to 
respond as quickly and accurately as possible. The perceptual comparison task was 
similar, with two differences: the instructions asked participants to select the face that 
generated the stronger visual percept, and a third response option of ‘‘about equal’’ was 
offered. After each task, participants were asked whether they had been able to 
recognise any of the faces displayed during the experiment, and were strongly 
encouraged to guess.  
The participant was shown the famous faces one at a time in a random sequence 
and asked to identify each person, either by name or by sufficient biographical detail to 
uniquely pinpoint the person. After the face identification, the participant was shown the 
famous faces again, one at a time, in a different random sequence, and asked to rate 
each person on a 7-point scale from -3 (very evil) through 0 (neutral) to +3 (very good). 
Participants were asked to evaluate the person, not the face, considering any 
knowledge they had of the person. Participants were told ‘‘There are no right or wrong 
answers, it is entirely your own opinion. Please do not think too long and give your first 
impression.’’ Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
Results 
If a participant could not correctly identify a famous face in the post-experimental 
identification, all trials for this combination of participant and item were excluded from 
the analysis (4.8% of trials). All participants insisted they had been unable to recognise 
any of the faces during the experimental tasks. Trials were excluded if the response 
time was faster than 100ms (probable anticipations; including the backward mask this 
was 200ms from face offset; 0.001of trials) and over 2000ms (5.5% of trials). A face 
was categorised as evil for a participant if the valence rating was below zero, and as 
good if the valence rating was 0 or above, to distinguish between evil faces and the rest. 
A correct response was scored as the selection of the famous face. The presence of a 
third response option of ‘‘about equal’’ in the perceptual comparison, which could not 
score as a correct response, resulted in mean accuracy (selecting the famous face in 
each pair) below 50%.  
Explicit familiarity  
Response accuracy per item (mean = 0.470, SE = 0.016) was obviously not 
above chance, confirming the absence of awareness of facial familiarity, and by 
assumption, of facial identity. As reported in Stone and Valentine (2004, Experiment 1), 
accuracy was lower in participants who evaluated a famous person as evil than in 
participants who evaluated the same target person as good.  
Perceptual comparison: Analysis of valence and response latency  
Responses were analysed in six ranges measured from face offset: 200–500 ms, 
500–700 ms, 700–900 ms, 900–1100 ms, 1100–1500 ms, and over 1500ms. The 
selection of these ranges was a compromise between the desire to include as many 
ranges as possible, to provide a sensitive analysis of the data, and the desire to 
maximise the number of items without missing data, which requires fewer ranges: 5 of 
the 10 items has complete data. The expectation was that response accuracy would be 
lower for participants who evaluated a famous person as evil than for those who 
evaluated the same person as good, for some range of response latencies, not 
including the very fast or slower latencies.  
Figure 1presents an illustration of the data. No statistical tests were performed 
because of the small number of items. Figure 1shows a tendency for response accuracy 
to dip for evil faces in the range 500–700 ms, while response accuracy for good faces 
shows a peak in the same latency range. A similar pattern was observed when partial 
data for all 10 items were included. This pattern suggests that affective modulation of 
the strength of the visual percept may occur for responses in the range of 500–700 ms.  
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Figure 1: Mean response accuracy in the perceptual comparison task of Experiment 1, 
by valence and response latency (A) and by visual field and response latency (B).  
Perceptual comparison: Analysis of visual field and response latency  
A separate prediction had been made that accuracy for famous faces presented 
in the RVF should increase from short to long latency responses, while accuracy for 
famous faces presented in the LVF should be equivalent on short and long latency 
responses. Data were calculated in the same latency ranges used above, for famous 
faces presented in the LVF and RVF. One item had missing data. Figure 1presents an 
illustration; no statistical tests were performed because of the small number of items. 
The data presented in Figure 1appear consistent with expectation.  
Discussion  
Figure 1illustrates the possibility that the strength of the consciously experienced 
visual percept of a masked 17ms famous face varied with response latency and 
affective valence, and with response latency and visual field. The visual percept of an 
‘‘evil’’ face may have been weakened, and that of a ‘‘good’’ face may have been 
strengthened, for responses in the latency range 500–700 ms. The right hemisphere 
may be able to construct a stronger visual percept of a famous face than an unfamiliar 
face at all response latencies, while the left hemisphere may be able to do so only at 
longer latencies.  
The experiment should be regarded as illustrative owing to the small number of 
items. Experiment 2 was designed to include a much larger number of items to enable a 
formal statistical analysis.  
Experiment 2 
The number of stimuli was increased from 10 to 60. The famous persons were 
selected from a previous study on the criterion that they generated mixed evaluations, 
which would permit a rigorous within-items analysis. Participants were asked to 
evaluate the degree of disgust evoked by each famous person. The emotion of disgust 
was chosen because this was thought to underlie the effects previously observed in the 
explicit familiarity task (Stone & Valentine, 2004, in press-b) and the attention 
orientation task (Stone & Valentine, in press-a). The emotion of disgust serves to 
protect against physical or psychological contamination and motivates avoidance of the 
object of disgust (e.g., Charash & McKay, 2002; Druschel & Sherman, 1999; Izard, 
1977; Levenson, 1994; Nabi, 2002; Newhagen, 1998; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1999). 
Psychological contamination could occur because of association with an unpleasant 
individual, and disgust has been specifically related to the avoidance of ideas or 
persons regarded as morally corrupt (Izard, 1977; Nabi, 2002; Rozin et al., 1999). Thus, 
disgust was thought to underlie the below chance accuracy of explicit familiarity 
responses to the faces of famous persons evaluated as evil, and the orientation of 
attention away from these faces.  
For the interaction of disgust rating with response latency, the predictions were 
as follows: responses to high-disgust evoking faces would be of lower accuracy on trials 
with latency in the range 500–700 ms than on shorter or longer latency trials; responses 
to low-disgust evoking faces would be of higher accuracy in the range 500–700 ms than 
on shorter or longer latency trials. For the interaction of visual field with response 
latency, the prediction was that accuracy would increase from short to long latency trials 
for famous faces presented in the RVF-LH, and show no change for famous faces 
presented in the LVF-RH.  
The response option ‘‘equal’’ was removed from the perceptual comparison so 
that participants were compelled to select either the LVF face or the RVF face on each 
trial.  
Method  
Only the changes from Experiment 1 will be noted.  
Participants  
Participants were 46 first-year undergraduate students at Goldsmiths College, 
London. Three participants were excluded whose individual performance was above 
chance in selecting famous compared to unfamiliar faces in the explicit familiarity 
decision (binomial distribution, one-tailed, cut-off at 0.57correct, a = 0.05) since for 
these participants, the possibility of some awareness cannot be ruled out. Two more 
participants were excluded who correctly identified fewer than 40 of the 60 items, and 
one participant who failed to comply with experimental instructions. The remaining 40 
participants were 33 female and 7 male, aged between 18 and 44, mean = 22.1, s.d. = 
6.8 years. All had watched UK television for at least 5 years by self-report to maximise 
the likelihood of knowledge of the famous faces.  
Stimuli  
The stimulus set comprised 60 pairs of one famous with one unfamiliar face. The 
faces in each pair were matched on sex, race, and approximate age, and showed a 
similar pose and facial expression. No data were collected to verify equivalence 
between the famous and unfamiliar faces on distinctiveness, attractiveness, or any 
other feature on which the stimuli might vary. The intention was to perform analyses 
within-items, with each famous person rated as low-disgust evoking by some 
participants and as high-disgust evoking by others, so that systematic variations 
between famous faces and their paired unfamiliar faces could not explain any observed 
experimental result. Names and examples of stimuli are given in Appendix A.  
Design  
Participants performed three tasks on masked 17ms faces, always in the 
sequence of attention orientation, explicit familiarity, and perceptual comparison.  
In each of the explicit familiarity and perceptual comparison, there were two 
factors of visual field of famous face (LVF or RVF) and evoked disgust (high or low; 
defined by each participant for each item). The dependent variable was accuracy of 
response, and a correct response was scored by selecting the famous face. Each face 
pair was presented twice, with the famous face appearing once each in left and right 
visual fields, for a total of 120 trials, presented in a single block. The sequence of 
presentation was randomised by the computer for each participant.  
Procedure  
The procedure for the explicit familiarity and perceptual comparison tasks was 
the same as Experiment 1, with the following changes. One, participants had to make a 
response within 2000 ms of the onset of the question ‘‘left or right’’ or the program 
proceeded to the next trial and no response was accepted. Two, the ‘‘equal’’ response 
option was not allowed so that participants were compelled to select either the LVF or 
the RVF face.  
Three, the evaluation of the famous persons was altered. After identifying the 
faces, participants were shown the famous faces, one at a time, in a random sequence, 
and asked to rate on a 7-point scale ‘‘how much each famous person disgusts you’’ (1 = 
not at all, 4 = moderately, 7 = very much). The emotion of disgust was explained as 
similar to distaste and disapproval. Participants were asked to evaluate the disgust 
invoked by the person, not the face, considering any knowledge they had of the person. 
Participants were told ‘‘There are no right or wrong answers, it is entirely your own 
opinion. Please do not think too long and give your first impression.’’ Finally, participants 
were debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
Results  
If a participant could not correctly identify a famous face, all trials for this 
combination of participant and item were excluded from the analysis of all tasks (11.4% 
of trials). Some faces were recognised during the explicit familiarity or perceptual 
comparison tasks. Taking a cautious approach, all trials for these combinations of 
participant and item were excluded from the analysis of both tasks (0.8% of trials). Trials 
on which no response was made were excluded from the analysis (1.4%/1.2% of trials 
in the explicit familiarity/perceptual comparison). Trials were excluded as probable 
anticipations if the response time was faster than 100ms (including the backward mask 
this was 200ms from face offset; 4.6%/6.8% of trials). A correct response was scored as 
the selection of the famous face.  
Explicit familiarity  
Response accuracy per item (mean = 0.509, SE = 0.009) was at chance, t(59) = 
0.99, ns, confirming the absence of awareness of facial familiarity, and by assumption, 
of facial identity.  
Perceptual comparison: Analysis of evoked disgust and response latency  
A face was categorised as high-disgust evoking for a participant if the rating of 
disgust was 5 or above, and as low-disgust evoking if the rating was 4 or below 
(minimum rating was 1 and maximum was 7). Responses were analysed in three 
latency ranges, measured from stimulus face offset: 200–500 ms, 500–700 ms, and 
700–2000 ms. These were chosen because the 500–700 ms range had suggested 
lowest accuracy for evil faces, and a peak in accuracy for good faces, in Experiment 1. 
The proportion of trials in each latency range was 0.36, 0.29, and 0.35, respectively.  
ANOVA was performed with two within-item factors of evoked disgust (high vs. 
low) and response latency (200–500 ms vs. 500–700 ms vs. 700–2000 ms). The 
dependent variable was mean response accuracy. Fifteen items had missing data. The 
two-way interaction of evoked disgust with response latency was significant, F(2, 43) = 
4.24, MSE = 0.045, p < 0.03. Paired comparisons revealed that for the high-disgust 
faces, 500–700 ms latency responses were less accurate than shorter or longer latency 
responses, F(1,44) = 6.80, MSE = 0.128, p = .012, while shorter and longer latency 
responses did not differ from each other, F = 0. For the low-disgust faces, 500– 700ms 
latency responses tended to be more accurate than shorter or longer latency 
responses, F(1,44) = 2.49, ns, and shorter and longer latency responses did not differ 
from each other, F < 1. See Figure 2 and Table 1.  
Perceptual comparison: Analysis of visual field and response latency  
ANOVA was performed with two within-item factors of famous face visual field 
(LVF vs. RVF) and response latency (200–500 ms vs. 500–700 ms vs. 700–2000 ms). 
The dependent variable was mean response accuracy. No items had missing data. The 
two-way interaction of famous face visual field with response latency was significant, 
F(2, 58) = 4.55, MSE = 0.021, p < 0.02. Paired-samples t tests (with a set at 0.0167) 
revealed that 200–500 ms responses were more accurate when the famous face was in 
the LVF than the RVF, t(59) = 3.99, p < 0.001, and 500–700 ms responses tended to be 
more accurate for famous faces in the LVF than the RVF, t(59) = 2.10, p = 0.04, while 
700–2000 ms responses showed no difference between LVF and RVF, t(59) = 0.17, ns. 
For famous faces in the LVF, 200–500 ms and 700–2000 ms responses were equally 
accurate, t(59) = 1.66, ns, while for famous faces in the RVF, 700–2000 ms responses 
were more accurate than 200–500 ms latency responses, t(59) = 2.51, p = 0.015. See 
Figure 2 and Table 1.  
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Figure 2: Mean response accuracy in the perceptual comparison task of 
Experiment 2, by valence and response latency (A) and by visual field and response 
latency (B). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals calculated according to Eq. (4) of 
Loftus and Masson (1994).  
 
 
Table 1: Mean accuracy (and standard error) by response latency and degree of evoked 
disgust (n = 45) or visual field (n = 60), using  Data from Experiment 2.  
Response latency (ms) Evoked disgust Visual field 
 High Low LVF RVF 
200-500 0.579 
(0.036)  
0.529 
(0.023)  
0.583 
(0.021) 
0.476 
(0.021) 
500-700 0.439 
(0.044)   
0.560 
(0.021)  
0.562 
(0.021) 
0.500 
(0.022) 
700-2000 0.577 
(0.034) 
0.520 
(0.019) 
0.538 
(0.023) 
0.543 
(0.020) 
 
Discussion  
The observation of overall accuracy at chance in the explicit familiarity decision 
confirms that faces were perceived without awareness of familiarity, and by assumption, 
without awareness of identity.  
In the perceptual comparison, when the famous person was rated high-disgust 
evoking, the relative strength of the visual percept of the famous compared to the 
unfamiliar face changed with response latency, being lower on 500–700 ms latency 
trials than on shorter or longer latency trials. When the famous person was rated low-
disgust evoking, the relative strength of the visual percept for the famous compared to 
the unfamiliar face did not vary with response latency, although there was a non-
significant tendency for response accuracy to be highest at the 500–700 ms range. This 
pattern of results supports the prediction for the perceptual comparison task regarding 
high-disgust evoking faces.  
The perceptual comparison showed higher response accuracy for LVF faces 
than RVF faces on short latency trials, with no difference on long latency trials. 
Accuracy increased with response latency for RVF faces but not for LVF faces. This 
pattern of results supports the concept that the right hemisphere can construct a 
stronger visual percept of a famous than an unfamiliar face more rapidly than the left 
hemisphere.  
General discussion 
The explicit familiarity decision showed overall accuracy at chance in 
Experiments 1and 2, confirming the absence of awareness of facial familiarity and, by 
assumption, of facial identity.  
The perceptual comparison showed an interesting pattern: the relative strength of 
the visual percept of a famous face compared to an unfamiliar face varied with response 
latency and participants’ attitude towards the famous person. For participants who rated 
the famous person as evoking high disgust, the visual percept of the famous face was 
relatively strong on short latency trials (below 500ms), then declined on trials with 
latency in the range 500–700 ms, before increasing again on longer latency trials (over 
700ms). A tendency for this pattern was observed in Experiment 1 (the small number of 
items did not permit statistical tests) and confirmed in Experiment 2. The relative 
weakness of the visual percept of high-disgust evoking faces on 500–700 ms latency 
trials was attributed to re-entrant feedback from the representation of the affective 
valence to the earlier representation of the visual image of the face. The feedback 
required some time to become effective and was also transient, so the visual percept 
was relatively strong on shorter latency trials (below 500ms) and on longer latency trials 
(over 700ms).  
Conceptual models of feedback processing, mentioned in Section 1, will be 
described in some more detail in order to interpret the present findings. Vogel et al. 
(1998) proposed that processing of visual stimuli proceeds in two stages: the perceptual 
stage that identifies stimuli and occurs without awareness, and a post-perceptual stage 
of processing that may result in awareness. They suggested that the visual system is 
able to identify stimuli faster than they can be processed by post-perceptual systems. 
One implication is that interference with post-perceptual processing (for example, by 
backward masking) could impair awareness and the accuracy of overt report without 
impairing perceptual processing. Another implication is that modulation of post-
perceptual processing by identity-dependent affective valence could result in enhanced 
or weakened awareness of the stimulus.  
Martens et al. (2002) cite converging evidence that awareness of the presence 
and identity of a visual stimulus requires an attentional process consisting of a feedback 
mechanism from high-level representations to preceding low-level representations. This 
follows a feedforward cycle that activates representations in subsequent processing 
levels, up to stimulus identity and meaning. Visual awareness is critically dependent on 
the feedback cycle re-activating early representations in primary visual cortex. Such 
feedback can be interpreted as a process of binding the high-level representations to 
the lower-level representations that caused their activation. This would seem to allow 
the possibility that high-level identity-dependent stimulus properties could modulate the 
feedback mechanism and so influence the low-level visual representations.  
Both of these models (Martens et al., 2002; Vogel et al., 1998) appear to have 
conceptual similarity with the theorising of Kanwisher (2001) that awareness of a 
stimulus requires a link between semantic ‘‘type’’ information and spatio-temporal 
‘‘token’’ information. This link might occupy the same conceptual function as the post-
perceptual stages of Vogel et al and the feedback cycle of Martens et al.  
Di Lollo et al. (2000) developed an explicit computational model (CMOS) along 
similar lines of reasoning. The CMOS model explains that processing of a visual 
stimulus proceeds through sequential levels increasing in abstractness from the visuo-
spatial event. Re-entrant neural projections from association cortex attempt to connect 
with low-level representations in primary visual cortex (a post-perceptual feedback 
process). Awareness of a stimulus depends on a match between the re-entrant high-
level visual representation and ongoing lower-level activity in primary visual cortex. The 
CMOS model accounts for the effectiveness of backward masking by proposing that the 
mask replaces the masked stimulus as the object of ongoing lower-level activity, 
producing a mismatch with the re-entrant visual representation of the stimulus, and so 
precluding awareness of the stimulus. If the masked stimulus is still generating some 
attenuated lower-level activity then presumably, a partial match with the re-entrant 
visual representation can be made, and so a vague, partial visual percept can be 
experienced. Affective modulation of the re-entrant neural projections from association 
cortex to primary visual cortex would result in a consciously experienced visual percept 
whose strength depends on the affect invoked by the stimulus.  
Any of these conceptual accounts could explain how an identity-dependent 
attribute of a stimulus (e.g., affective valence) can modify the strength of the 
consciously experienced visual percept in the absence of awareness of stimulus identity 
or even of stimulus familiarity.  
The relative strength of the visual percept of famous faces compared to 
unfamiliar faces also varied with visual field and response latency. The visual percept 
was stronger for famous faces presented in the LVF (to the right hemisphere) than for 
famous faces presented in the RVF at short response latency (up to 500ms), with no 
difference at longer latencies; the visual percept strengthened from short to long latency 
trials for famous faces presented in the RVF, and showed no change for famous faces 
presented in the LVF. This pattern supports the proposition that the right hemisphere 
can construct a visual percept that distinguishes between famous and unfamiliar faces 
more rapidly than the left hemisphere (e.g., Seeck et al., 1997).  
It is possible that the famous faces may have enjoyed some systematic 
advantage in the perceptual comparison over the unfamiliar faces, perhaps being more 
attractive or more distinctive, or perhaps the advantage of perceptual fluency (e.g., 
Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) since the perceptual system has had previous experience of 
processing a famous face. Any systematic difference that favoured famous faces over 
unfamiliar faces could have had the effect of elevating overall response accuracy. 
However, this factor alone could not explain the pattern of accuracy dependent on 
response latency for high-disgust evoking faces, or the pattern of accuracy varying with 
visual field and response latency.  
Regarding future studies, event-related potentials might help to shed light on the 
temporal pattern of differences in neural activity dependent on the degree of disgust 
evoked by famous faces. Also, fMRI data could clarify those brain regions in which 
differences in neural activity occur. The generality of these findings could be tested by 
repeating the experiment using a different class of stimulus, for example words or 
pictures, or using faces depicting an expression of disgust, rather than facial identities.  
In conclusion, when famous faces were presented so briefly that they could not 
be consciously perceived with sufficient clarity to permit identification or even familiarity 
detection, they were processed differently according to the participants’ emotional 
reaction to the famous person. The differences reported here appear to relate to the 
emotion of disgust and are consistent with avoidance or weaker processing of the faces 
of famous persons evoking a high degree of disgust.  
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 Appendix A. Stimuli 
Experiment 1  
Pop stars: Mick Jagger, Cliff Richard  
Politicians: Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein, J.F.Kennedy, Margaret Thatcher  
TV presenters: Chris Evans  
Film/TV actors: Richard Gere  
Others: Myra Hindley (murderess), Mike Tyson (boxer and rapist)  
Experiment 2 
Pop stars: Victoria Beckham, Cher, Eminem, Liam Gallagher, Geri Halliwell, Whitney 
Houston, Janet Jackson, Michael Jackson, Mick Jagger, Elton John, Jennifer Lopez, 
Madonna, George Michael, Elvis Presley, Cliff Richard, Britney Spears, Robbie Williams  
Royal family: Prince Charles, Queen Elizabeth, Sarah Ferguson  
Politicians: Osama Bin Laden, Tony Blair, George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, William Hague, 
Adolf Hitler, J.F. Kennedy, John Major, Margaret Thatcher  
TV presenters: Michael Barrymore, Cilla Black, Paul Daniels, Chris Evans, Bruce 
Forsyth, Rolf Harris, Richard Madeley, Anne Robinson, Jonathan Ross, Chris Tarrant, 
Carol Vordeman  
Film/TV actors: Jim Carrey, Martin Clunes, Russell Crowe, Tom Cruise, Leonardo 
Dicaprio, Michael Douglas, Callista Flockhart, Sarah Michelle Gellar, Hugh Grant, Ross 
Kemp, Gwynneth Paltrow, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Sylvester Stallone, Catherine Zeta-
Jones  
Others: Rowan Atkinson (comedian), David Beckham (sports), Richard Branson 
(entrepreneur), Naomi Campbell (model), Luciano Pavarotti (opera singer), O.J. 
Simpson (sports)  
Appendix B. Examples of stimuli and the mask  
 
 
